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This paper aims at illustrating how from the works of John Rawls we can see emerging a 
viable anti-foundationalist cosmopolitan and deliberative democratic approach to liberalism. 
I shall argue that, despite what some of his critics believe, Rawls’s liberal theory of justice (1) 
is not concerned with foundational preoccupations (e.g. Michael Sandel); (2) does not ignore 
concrete processes of collective deliberation over matters of public interests (e.g. Amy 
Guttman, Dennis Thomson, Brian Barry); (3) nor does it endorse rigid limits to the scope of 
democratic deliberation (e.g. Jeremy Waldron, John Gray, Richard Bellamy). Yet I shall 
claim, following Andrew Kuper, that (4) there is a real risk of infringing individuals’ primary 
moral significance in trying to stretch too much the limits of liberal toleration in order to 
accommodate political liberalism with multiculturalism in the international sphere. 
 
 
1. Political liberalism and anti-foundationalism 
 
Michael Sandel, one of the main critics of John Rawls’s liberalism, sees it as an 
instance of that “deontological liberalism”, stemming from Kant’s 
transcendental approach, concerned not only with moral and political principles 
but also with their foundations. That is, he thinks that Rawls endorses 
deontological liberalism not only in its moral sense, opposed to consequentialism 
as a first-order political and moral position «containing certain categorical 
duties and prohibitions which take unqualified precedence over other moral and 
practical concerns», but also in its foundational sense, opposed to teleology as «a 
form of justification in which first principles are derived in a way that does not 
presuppose any final human purpose or end, nor any determinate conception of 
the human good». (1)  
Contrary to this conviction at the basis of Sandel’s criticisms of Rawls’s 
liberalism, which I shall not deal with here, I shall show how Rawls, during the 
past thirty years, as he himself continually repeated, was just trying to put 
together into a coherent and clear system the political and moral assumptions 
and intuitions that he took as best expressing the liberal respect for people’s 
freedom and equality, without any consideration of their epistemological status, 
 2
let alone attempting to show their epistemological privilege over the 
assumptions and intuitions of other moral and political traditions. As he said, 
his conception of justice is «political, not metaphysical», and this means, 
amongst other things, that he took his conception of justice as a first-order 
moral and political conception without any epistemological privilege attached 
to it. I shall thus show that Rawls provides a concrete example of a viable anti-
foundationalist endorsement of liberalism; a concrete example of an affirmative 
answer to Sandel’s rhetorical question: «Can liberalism of the first [moral] kind 
be defended without recourse to the second [foundational]?» (2) We can start 
shedding some light on why Sandel is wrong in regarding Rawls as holding a 
foundational position by noting that there is no epistemological tension in the 
difference between deontological and teleological conceptions. What I mean by 
this is that every deontological position has a value, or a set of values, the 
satisfaction of which sets a final end to aim towards; and every teleological 
position has a value, or a set of values, that it considers to be of the most 
fundamental importance and not subject to compromise. Namely, any point of 
view stands on some basic values which can be conceived both, in a 
deontological way, as a matter of ultimate importance not to be questioned, 
and, in a teleological way, as the ultimate end towards which to direct our 
practices. There is really no epistemological difference involved here, but only a 
different way of accounting for the last court of appeal of our justifications, 
either as a final end or as first principle. Thus, both teleological and 
deontological justifications end in some ultimate value, or set of values, which 
does not presuppose any other one. If you have foundationalist inclinations you 
will regard that last set of values as corresponding to how things really are in 
themselves; if you have anti-foundationalist inclinations you will think instead 
that that set of values, which is the last court of appeal for our justifications, 
stands only on itself, that it constitutes only the ungrounded territory on which 
we currently stand. But this epistemological difference does not concern the 
choice of viewing our ultimate values as final ends or as first principles. 
I think the cause of this misreading of the difference underlying the distinction 
between deontological and teleological theories lies in the potentially misleading 
formulation of the actual moral and political opposition traditionally involved 
in that distinction. This is the opposition that Sandel himself acknowledges as 
being behind the deontology-versus-consequentialism divide, an opposition 
between first-order moral and political theories holding different views about 
the fundamental values to which to give primacy, and that is usually 
formulated in terms of theories that give priority to the right over the good and 
those that instead put the good before the right.  
The priority of the right over the good is indeed the central conviction at the 
basis of Rawls’s – and in fact of any form of – liberalism. I say that this can be 
a misleading formulation of the central tenet of liberalism because, by setting 
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the right over the good, it may lead, and in fact has led, people to think that 
liberalism is based on the claim that its conception of justice, of the right way in 
which to regiment our social interactions and collective decision-making 
practices, stands on an epistemologically different ground from our conceptions 
of what it means to live a good life. Indeed, it has led people to think that 
liberalism maintains that the right stands on itself in an epistemologically 
privileged way, independent of any conception of the good. This reading of the 
difference between the right and the good may well suit Kant’s transcendental 
conception of morality, but it does not necessarily have to be linked with the 
liberal thesis of the priority of the right over the good. This thesis, when held 
with an anti-foundationalist conscience, amounts to nothing else than the 
statement with which Rawls opened his Theory of Justice, namely, that 
according to liberalism «justice is the first virtue of social institutions». (3) And 
whatever a virtue is, it surely is connected with our conception of the good life. 
Claiming the priority of justice over other values – the welfare of society as a 
whole, for example – amounts only to the first-order moral and political claim 
that «the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to 
the calculus of social interests», (4) and not to the epistemological one that the 
liberal conception of justice, standing detached and aloof from any 
consideration of the good, must be regarded as the conception that we would 
endorse once we divested ourselves of our prejudicial views of the good life. To 
say that the rights secured for people by justice are not to be subject to political 
bargaining is simply to express a particular moral and political position about 
the main concerns and values to which a liberal community must give priority 
in considering how to organize its main structures and institutions, namely, 
about the restrictions on conceptions of the good whose pursuit must be 
regarded as acceptable for a society of free and equal persons. As Rawls says, 
 
In justice as fairness the priority of right implies that the principles of 
(political) justice impose limits to permissible ways of life; and hence the 
claims citizens make to pursue ends that transgress those limits have no 
weight (as judged by that political conception). (5) 
 
What we need to know in order to come to an adequate understanding of 
political liberalism is what conception of the liberal good is conveyed by 
“justice as fairness”: what exactly are the principles of political justice that we 
would choose from the standpoint of justice as fairness in order to foster and 
instantiate that conception? In the course of our answering these questions, and 
thus explaining the moral and political content of justice as fairness, we will 
also come to a proper appreciation of its anti-foundationalist character. 
We can start answering those questions by pointing out the main motivating 
concern behind Rawls’s elaboration of justice as fairness. This is to give 
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adequate expression to the two fundamental values of the liberal tradition: 
freedom and equality. The basic concern that these values pose for a liberal 
society is that of political legitimacy. Rawls’s approach to the political question 
of legitimacy follows the tradition of social contract theories of justice, and 
maintains that, given both the pluralistic nature of our society and the coercive 
nature of state power, the governing organisms of the state can exercise their 
power legitimately only by submitting the choice of the principles regulating 
the terms of social cooperation and the processes of collective decision-making 
to the free and considered assent of its citizens regarded as free and equal 
persons. This is what Rawls calls the «liberal principle of legitimacy».(6) It 
amounts to the familiar democratic claim that, in a liberal society, state power 
is legitimated only when it is exercised with the free consent of, as far as 
possible, everyone bound by it. 
From this central idea Rawls starts drawing the lines of his conception of 
justice. The central point is that this is a political conception. For a conception 
of justice to be political means three things:  
 
First, that it is a moral conception worked out for a specific subject, 
namely, the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime; second, 
that accepting the political conception does not presuppose any particular 
comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine; rather, the 
political conception presents itself as a reasonable conception for the basic 
structure alone; and third, that it is formulated not in terms of any 
comprehensive doctrine but in terms of certain fundamental ideas viewed as 
latent in the public political culture of a democratic society. (7) 
 
The basic structures of a society are the major political, economical and social 
institutions that regulate the assignment of fundamental rights and duties to 
citizens and the distribution of the benefits coming from their social 
cooperation. The main consideration behind the limitation of the subject of the 
conception of justice for a democratic society to its fundamental institutions, 
which links the first with the other two features of the political, is that to lay 
down regulating principles that extend beyond the limits of the main 
institutions of political, social and economical life to the whole of life is not 
consistent with respect for the freedom and equality of the citizens of a pluralist 
and democratic society. This is because, given the fact of the plurality of 
incommensurable conceptions of the good and incompatible ways of life, «as a 
practical political matter no general moral conception can provide a publicly 
recognized basis for a conception of justice in a modern democratic state».(8) 
This means that there is no way to legislate on every aspect of life without 
violating the values of freedom and equality, for «a continuing shared 
understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine 
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can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power».(9)  The idea is 
that a political conception of justice for a constitutional democracy committed 
to safeguarding the equality and the freedom of its citizens «should be, so far as 
possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines», it 
must be presented as a «freestanding view». From this it follows that 
 
to formulate such a conception we apply the principle of tolerance to 
philosophy itself: the public conception of justice is to be political not 
metaphysical. (10) 
 
This point, corresponding to the second feature of the political, is what lies 
behind the claim that for liberals the right takes priority over the good, and it is 
made clear, for example, by Rawls’s remark that a political conception of 
justice «is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and can be 
supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the 
society regulated by it». (11)  
The freestanding character of political liberalism is a direct consequence of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy according to which, given people’s different and 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines, there is no other way to propose a non-
oppressive organization of society than to look for principles of justice that, as 
far as possible, all citizens could freely and reasonably endorse; principles that, 
as Rawls puts it, could be «the focus of an overlapping consensus of at least the 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed by its citizens». (12) This implies 
that a liberal society requires from its citizens a commitment to a particular 
“civil duty”, «the duty to be able to explain to one another…how the principles 
and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values 
of public reason», (13) intended as «the reason of equal citizens who, as a 
collective body, exercise a final political and coercive power over another in 
enacting laws and in amending their constitution».(14) 
It is this idea of reasonable consensus obtained through a collective rational 
deliberation respectful of everyone’s freedom and equality that lies behind the 
claim to primacy of the right over the good. This primacy expresses in fact the 
restraints to be placed on collective decision-making for it to be accepted as 
reasonable. It expresses the idea that in order to bring about a reasonable 
consensus among people holding and pursuing different conceptions of the good 
we need to draw as few restrictions to the acceptable ways of life of citizens as is 
compatible with the equal freedom of everyone to pursue their own way of life; 
we need, that is, to give priority to the value of having as much respect for 
every citizen’s choice of the good life as is consistent with their equal freedom, 
over the conviction that only one particular conception of the good life is worth 
following and should thus be imposed over the others. 
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It is here, in the reference to “reasonableness”, that we find one of the points 
where the moral character of Rawls’s liberal conception of justice – its being a 
conception of the good – is made the more manifest. This is also one of the 
points in which Rawls most clearly expresses his distance from the 
foundationalist tradition. The point of insisting on the reasonableness of the 
comprehensive doctrines supporting the liberal conception of justice is, in fact, 
to recognize that not any kind of pluralism, not any project of the good life, is 
consistent with a democratic organization of society; that the possibility of 
realizing a pluralist, free and equal society depends on its citizens endorsing, 
along with their own particular different conceptions of the good life and 
rationality, the same conception of public reason, the same conception of how 
best to regulate their encounters and cooperation in respecting each other’s 
freedom and equality. It is to recognize that, in order for different and 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines to be able to cohabit in a liberal society, 
they must share a particular moral attitude and virtue, that of reasonableness, 
intended as «the willingness to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide 
by them provided others do», (15) the civic virtue that involves «a willingness 
to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to 
their views should reasonably be made». (16) It is to recognize, that is, that 
participation in a liberal society requires the willingness to enter into public 
deliberation about matters of common concern in respecting each other as free 
and equal persons.  
This recognition has great importance for a proper understanding and 
evaluation of the liberal project, especially in view of answering the criticisms 
that insist on its partiality, on its failure to abide by its aim of presenting a 
freestanding point of view on justice, of creating a state neutral towards its 
citizens’ conceptions of the good. We can see how a liberal response to this 
criticism may go by noting that Rawls is aware that the liberal project does not 
intend to be neutral towards any point of view; aware that this intention would 
be self-stultifying since, aiming at building a reasonable society, liberalism must 
stand in direct opposition to all the unreasonable tendencies that represent a 
menace for its realization, i.e. the illiberal tendencies to violate the fair terms of 
social cooperation and the freedom and equality of persons. As he says:  
 
Even though political liberalism seeks common ground and is neutral in 
aim, it is important to emphasize that it may still affirm the superiority of 
certain forms of moral character and encourage certain moral virtues...the 
virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and 
tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness…The principles of any 
reasonable political conception must impose restriction on permissible 
comprehensive views, and the basic institutions those principles require 
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inevitably encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or even 
exclude them altogether. (17) 
 
Rawls is then aware that the priority of right does not mean that we must 
avoid ideas of good. It only means that «the ideas used must be political ideas: 
they must be tailored to meet the restrictions imposed by the [liberal] political 
conception of justice».(18) Thus, to be reasonable is, for Rawls, to demonstrate 
one of the virtues required for the working of a free and equal pluralist society, 
and by insisting on the requirement of reasonableness he intends to stress both 
the moral and political nature of the liberal project. 
By identifying the reasonable with a moral attitude Rawls also wants to create 
distance between himself and any foundationalist approach to ethics (19) and 
politics. For Rawls, in fact, to say that reasonableness is a moral virtue 
coincides with the denial that it is an epistemological idea, (20) and this denial 
means that in justice as fairness «there is no thought of deriving the reasonable 
from the rational». (21) In good pragmatist fashion Rawls distances himself 
from foundationalism by remarking that «only as a result of philosophy, or a 
subject in which the rational has a large place would anyone think it necessary 
to derive the reasonable from the rational»; (22) would anyone  
 
think that if the reasonable can be derived from the rational, that is, if some 
definite principles of justice can be derived from the preferences, or 
decisions, or arrangements, or agreements of merely rational agents in 
suitably specified circumstances, then the reasonable is at last on a firm 
basis. The moral skeptic has been answered. (23) 
 
According to Rawls the reasonable and the rational are two complementary 
moments of our lives. We manifest rationality when we deliberate over 
alternative courses of action from within the framework of a hierarchical 
system of values. Rationality is for Rawls the means to an end activity of 
finding the best way to act and to think about both factual and evaluative 
matters, in accordance to our ultimate system of values. We manifest instead 
reasonableness in our public behaviour, in our encounters with the others, 
especially with those holding different systems of values from our own. To be 
reasonable is to behave in accordance with the liberal principles of justice. 
Because of this complementarity there is no deriving of the reasonable, of the 
liberal principles of justice, from the rational. On the contrary, since our 
rationality works only within a system of values,  
 
it seems likely that any plausible derivation must situate rational agents in 
circumstances in which they are subject to certain appropriate conditions 
and these conditions will express the reasonable. (24) 
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This ethnocentric point will become even clearer once we have turned to 
consider the standpoint Rawls regards as best expressing the liberal idea of the 
good and the reasonable and as most appropriate from which to derive the 
liberal principles of justice, the standpoint of the original position. Although 
many have read the formulation of the original position as showing Rawls’s 
foundationalist inclinations, I shall show instead how it matches perfectly well 
with the last passage quoted, with the pragmatist subordination of the rational 
to the moral. Before turning to the original position, however, we have to shed 
some light on the third feature of the political, where the connection of Rawls’s 
conception of justice with anti-foundationalism is the closest. 
But first it is opportune to make two further observations that connect the 
second feature of the political to the anti-foundationalist predicament. I want 
to point out that to conceive of rationality as Rawls does, as embedded in our 
evaluative system and as incapable of answering the sceptic, is to join the 
pragmatist anti-foundationalist conception of rationality. In particular, I want 
to point out that from this ethnocentric conception it follows that, for those 
who are placed within the liberal ethnos, rationality comes to overlap with 
reasonableness; it comes, as Richard Rorty maintains, «to name a set of moral 
virtues: tolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to 
listen, reliance on persuasion rather than on force…the virtues which members 
of a civilized [read ‘liberal’] society must possess if the society is to endure». (25) 
My second remark, related to the first, concerns the significant point of contact 
between anti-foundationalism and liberalism. It ultimately concerns the fact 
that the priority of the right over the good can be intended as the priority of 
liberal values over Truth, the priority of the respect of people’s freedom and 
equality, as expressed in the liberal principle of legitimacy, over Philosophy. 
Indeed, we can see this point emerging, somewhat counter-intuitively, from 
Rawls’s very dissociation of liberalism from scepticism. Rawls points out that 
the liberal principle of legitimacy, which requires us to extend the application of 
the principle of toleration from religion to philosophy and to any sort of 
comprehensive doctrines, is not based on the consideration of the impossibility 
of the foundational project. In fact, the desideratum of publicity itself requires 
our political and moral conception not to presuppose any particular position on 
such controversial matters as those concerning the possibility of reaching 
Truth. As Rawls says, «it would be fatal to the idea of a political conception to 
see it as skeptical about, or indifferent to, truth. Such skepticism or indifference 
would put political philosophy in opposition to numerous comprehensive 
doctrines, and thus defeat from the outset its aim of achieving an overlapping 
consensus». (26) Of course, as we have seen, there may come times when our 
support for the ideals of political liberalism will require from us a direct 
involvement in controversial issues. These are the times when we have to 
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defend the basis of democratic cooperation of free and equal citizens against the 
threats coming from people not sharing liberal ideals of reasonableness. This 
will happen, for example, «whenever someone insists that certain questions are 
so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil strife». At 
this point, as Rawls recognizes, «we may have no alternative but to deny this, 
or to imply its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped to 
avoid». (27) Yet this defence of the liberal conditions of freedom and equality 
does not stand on foundationalist ground; it is just the result of the moral and 
political commitment of putting reasonableness as our overriding goal, immune 
from political bargaining. And precisely on this same moral and political ground 
stands the liberal extension of the principle of toleration to philosophy. The 
idea is that even if foundationalism were possible, even if we could get at the 
way things really are and should be, in the name of the values of freedom and 
equality we must refrain from imposing that God’s-eye view of things on 
everyone. The idea is that if we care about freedom and equality more than 
anything else we will have to ask God, or his representatives, to sit down with 
all the others at the table of free and open discussion. If we want to keep our 
encounters free and open, we must avoid a public foundationalist attitude. In 
this moral and political sense Rawls says that the extension of the principle of 
tolerance to philosophy is not the result of meta-philosophical scepticism. 
Both considerations can be seen as flowing directly from the liberal principle of 
justification, which we can now read as characterizing a liberal society in 
Rorty’s pragmatist terms, as «one which is content to call ‘true’ [read 
‘legitimated’] whatever the upshot of fair, open and free encounters turns out to 
be». (28) Such a society for Rawls, making the same point, 
 
replaces the search for moral truth interpreted as fixed by a prior and 
independent order of objects and relations, whether natural or divine, an 
order apart and distinct from how we conceive of ourselves with the search 
for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our conception of 
ourselves and in our relation to society. (29) 
 
That is, a liberal society replaces foundational rationality with conversational 
reasonableness. In the light of this conception of liberalism we can then 
paraphrase the idea of the priority of the right over the good in the terms of 
Rorty’s pragmatist slogan which says: «if we take care of political freedom, 
‘true’ and ‘good’ will take care of themselves». (30) The idea is that, although 
liberalism is philosophically neutral, if an Archimedean point were to exist it 
would not be suitable for liberalism, because, as Rawls remarks, given the fact 
of reasonable pluralism, 
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philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and 
moral order cannot provide a workable and shared basis for a political 
conception of justice for a democratic society. (31) 
 
However, if Rawls acknowledges that to endorse the liberal ideals of freedom 
and equality does not commit one to meta-philosophical scepticism – that «to 
deny that religious beliefs [as well as any other comprehensive beliefs] can be 
publicly and fully established by reason is not to say that they are not true» 
(32) – his own endorsement of political liberalism, as a member of a liberal 
community, does actually break with any Archimedean point in a more direct 
way than the political one just considered. This is shown by his conception of 
justification in moral and political matters, from which the third feature of 
political liberalism can be seen to follow. 
The conception of justification at the basis of Rawls’s formulation of the liberal 
principles of justice is, in fact, anti-foundationalist through and through. It is 
the holistic and ethnocentric view that since Theory of Justice has been 
associated with the expression “reflective equilibrium.” The idea behind this 
expression is that the justification of a conception of justice is not a matter of 
«deduction from self-evident premises or conditions on principles», but rather a 
matter of finding a considered balance, a “reflective equilibrium”, between our 
intuitive convictions and our theoretical principles by way of shaping our 
position from both sides – a matter, as Rawls puts it, «of the mutual support of 
many considerations, of everything fitting together into a coherent view». (33) 
Implicit in this view is that there is no belief and no principle which is a priori 
exempt from revision, that there is no way to anchor some of our beliefs and 
principles on necessary ground. As Rawls states it clearly in a subsequent paper, 
according to the view of “reflective equilibrium”, 
 
what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order 
antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper 
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, 
given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the 
most reasonable doctrine for us. (34)  
 
Just as the pragmatists, Rawls maintains that the only materials we can work 
on in order to formulate a particular conception of justice – indeed, in order to 
formulate any kind of conceptions – are the intuitive ideas, and more or less 
considered beliefs, that shape our points of view and that are usually embedded 
in the tradition of the culture we belong to. There is no way of resorting to an 
order transcending every practice. According to this holistic and ethnocentric 
view of justification the aim of political philosophy will not be, then, the 
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foundational one of finding a way to answer the moral sceptic and grounding an 
ideal just regime sub specie aeternitatis, but rather the pragmatist one 
 
to articulate and to make explicit those shared notions and principles 
thought to be already latent in common sense, or, as is often the case, if 
common sense is hesitant and uncertain, and does not know what to think, 
to propose to it certain conceptions and principles congenial to its most 
essential convictions and historical traditions. (35) 
 
If then the conception of justice to be worked out is for a democratic society, we 
shall have to «draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the 
political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the traditions of 
their interpretation». (36) As Rawls describes his own procedure: 
 
We collect such settled convictions as the beliefs in religious toleration and 
the rejection of slavery and try to organize the basic ideas and principles 
implicit in these convictions into a coherent conception of justice. We can 
regard these convictions as provisional fixed points which any conception of 
justice must account for if it is to be reasonable for us. We look, then, to our 
public political culture itself, including its main institutions and the 
historical traditions of their interpretation. The hope is that these ideas and 
principles can be formulated clearly enough to be combined into a 
conception of political justice congenial to our most firmly held convictions. 
(37) 
 
We have thus eventually arrived at the third feature of the political nature of 
Rawls’s “justice as fairness”, which turns out to be a direct consequence of its 
being a freestanding conception of justice. We have seen that if we want the 
conception of justice for the basic structure of a society to be democratically 
endorsed by its citizens, we must avoid as much as possible relying on any 
particular comprehensive doctrine, on any controversial idea and principle 
which we cannot expect that other people reasonably agree to. We must rather 
try to obtain an overlapping consensus relying as much as possible on a 
conception of public reason shaped by reciprocal respect for the equality and 
freedom of each point of view participating in the collective process of 
deliberation. And the best way to seek this public basis of agreement on a 
conception of justice for a pluralist society, without infringing people’s freedom 
and equality, Rawls tells us, is «to work from fundamental intuitive ideas 
implicit in the public culture and to abstract from comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrine». (38) Indeed, in the light of the “reflective 
equilibrium” conception of justification, this is the only possible way, for there 
is no possible appeal to an order antecedent to and given to us. 
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2. The epistemological and political significance of the original position: anti-
foundationalism (again), deliberative democracy and self-reflexivity 
 
Up to this point I have presented Rawls’s thought without consideration of its 
development from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. I followed this 
approach because it is my conviction that the changes that Rawls has made to 
his initial formulation of justice as fairness are more concerned with its 
presentation than with the substance of its content. These changes can be seen 
as the results of an effort to make the fundamental intuitions behind his 
conception of justice clearer in the light of the criticisms that have been 
mistakenly advanced against its initial formulation. These criticisms have been 
concerned mainly with Rawls’s use of the idea of the original position and it is 
exactly from these attempts at reformulating the basic intuitions of his 
conception of justice, without making any further use of that controversial idea, 
that the main changes in Rawls’s later thought are derived. 
I shall consider here two such criticisms, showing why they are mistaken 
notwithstanding their initial plausibility on a superficial reading of the 
construction of the original position, and how Rawls has thought to reformulate 
the basic concepts of justice as fairness in order to obviate them. One criticism 
is concerned with the epistemological significance of the original position, the 
other with its political significance for liberalism. In replying to them we shall 
be able to appreciate better both the anti-foundationalist character of Rawls’s 
liberalism and its endorsement of the value that must be regarded as central to 
a healthy liberal society, that of collective self-reflexive discussion over its 
fundamental rights claims and procedural principles. First a brief sketch of the 
original position. 
 
3.1. The original position 
 
The liberal principle of legitimacy is the fundamental idea shared by all theories 
of justice based on the notion of social contract. It does not come as a surprise, 
then, that Rawls resorts to the idea of the social contract, too. However, Rawls 
is unsatisfied with the way the classical contractualist theorists envisaged the 
contractual situation. He thinks they overlooked important moral intuitions 
that any appropriate formulation of the principles of justice for a liberal society 
must account for. Thus, by proposing justice as fairness he aims to obviate this 
defect by recasting the doctrine of the social contract in a way which 
«generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory». 
(39) 
While the classical theorists of the social contract imagined real men and real 
women, endowed with their place in society, their natural assets and their 
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particular interests and conceptions of the good, gathering together to bargain 
and reach an agreement on the form of government for their community, Rawls 
wants us to consider carefully what should be the conditions under which free 
and equal persons ought to enter an agreement on the principles of justice 
regulating the terms of social cooperation in order for that agreement, and thus 
those terms, to respect their freedom and equality. The idea at work here is that 
 
the most appropriate conception of justice for the basic structure of a 
democratic society is one that citizens would adopt in a situation that is fair 
between them and in which they are represented solely as free and equal 
persons. (40) 
 
According to Rawls, the classical social contract theories were far from 
considering fair conditions of encounter between the different contractual 
parties of society, and thus far from being able to arrive at appropriate 
principles of justice respecting all citizens’ freedom and equality; this is because, 
by considering those parties as real human beings with all their values, 
interests, natural talents and wealth, they were not able to ensure that 
imbalance between the bargaining powers of citizens – which, as Rawls 
remarks, «naturally arises within the background institutions of any society 
from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies» (41) – are 
eliminated; and allowing some people greater bargaining advantages than 
others means compromising the fairness of social interactions and the freedom 
of those who are disadvantaged. 
Rawls introduces the idea of the original position precisely to capture the 
egalitarian conviction, which the classical contractualist theories did not 
adequately account for, that the contractual parties are to be symmetrically 
situated in order to reach an agreement under fair conditions. That, when 
thinking about justice, the differences between persons due to natural 
contingencies (such as their sex, their race, their native talents) and to social 
chance (such as their wealth and their income), and those deriving from their 
different interests, values and conceptions of the good life, should be regarded as 
irrelevant, because, as Rawls says, «these aspects are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view».(42) It is this moral point of view that Rawls intends to give 
expression to through the idea of the original position. He does so by asking us 
to imagine the persons in the original situation as behind a “veil of ignorance” 
that deprives them of all that information about themselves that would give 
them some bargaining advantages or disadvantages. 
The original position, then, in order to create contractual conditions 
appropriate for a society of free and equal persons, places, through the device of 
the veil of ignorance, all persons on the same footing, so that no one will be able 
to choose principles that favour her particular interests. The assumption is that 
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«the fairness of the circumstances under which agreement is reached transfers 
to the principles of justice agreed to».(43) This is what yields the name “justice 
as fairness.” The idea is to «set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed 
to will be just». (44) 
However, if the veil of ignorance ensures fair procedural conditions, it does not 
yet enable us to see which principles would be chosen from the standpoint of the 
original position. In order to arrive at these principles we need some 
assumptions about the motivations of the contractual parties. We need to turn 
from what the parties must ignore in order to enter the initial position of 
fairness, to what they are allowed – and, indeed, need – to know in order to be 
able to make any choice at all. 
If the veil of ignorance represents the negative side of the liberal conception of 
the good, namely the idea that a just society should not base its collective 
decisions on any particular comprehensive conception of the good that is not 
unanimously endorsed by all its members, the assumptions about the 
motivations of the parties to the original position represent the positive side of 
the liberal good, namely the sphere of content of citizens’ conceptions of the 
good life that is considered compatible with an equal freedom of every citizen to 
pursue her own chosen or preferred way of life. Rawls maintains that, «since 
these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, 
the theory of good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to 
the bare essentials». (45) 
This theory of the good restricted to the bare essentials Rawls calls the “thin 
theory.” With this expression he intends to draw attention to the fact that the 
difference between the liberal conception of the good, as it is contained in the 
principle of the priority of the right over the good, and other conceptions of the 
good is a matter of extension: in fact, a matter of freedom and equality. The 
more a conception is extended – “comprehensive” – the more it imposes 
restraints on people’s choices. The liberal ideal is to reduce the restraints on 
people’s ways of life to the minimum, the minimum not being, though, the 
absence of any conception of the good. «Again, some view of goodness is used in 
defining justice as fairness». (46) The limits of the minimum are traced by what 
Rawls calls “primary goods”, those things that are «necessary as social 
conditions and all-purpose means to enable human beings to realize and exercise 
their moral powers and to pursue their final ends (assumed to lie within certain 
limits)». (47) 
The two moral powers are «the capacity to understand, to apply and to act 
from the principles of justice», and «the capacity to form, revise, and rationally 
to pursue a conception of the good». (48) The latter corresponds to our sense of 
freedom and yields the virtue of rationality, of rationally pursuing a plan of life; 
the former corresponds to our sense of equality and yields the virtue of 
reasonableness, of respecting our fellow citizens’ autonomy by committing 
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ourselves to the collective search for reasonable agreement and abiding by the 
agreed principles and rules. By endowing the parties in the original position 
with the capacity of being rational and reasonable we endow them with the 
sufficient and necessary motivation to derive the principles of justice for the 
basic structure of a society of free and equal citizens cooperating under fair 
conditions. In order to see which principles the parties would choose we now 
only need to solve a problem of rational choice: we have to find out, in the light 
of the restrictions on their knowledge and on their motivations, what is the 
rational choice of principles of justice regulating their main institutions’ 
assignment of rights and duties and the distribution of the resources coming 
from social cooperation, i.e. the choice that will best guarantee and promote 
their self-interest. 
To sum up the situation of the parties in the original position: they do not know 
their place in society – their social status, their wealth and income; nor do they 
know their fortune in the distribution of natural assets – their sex, race, 
strengths and physical abilities; they are also ignorant of their comprehensive 
doctrines – their philosophical, religious and moral conceptions – and their 
psychological setting – their natural propensities and interests. They also do not 
know the probability of belonging to one or another category, so that any 
propensity to take some risks to secure higher expectations will be curbed, and 
they will instead follow a “maximin” approach which will make them rank 
alternatives by their worst possible outcomes, choosing the one whose worst 
outcome is superior to the worst outcome of the others. What they know, 
though, is that they hold some particular conception of the good life to the 
pursuit of which they will direct their energies and resources (even if they do 
not know which), and they know that they are capable of abiding by the 
dictates of reasonableness. Assuming these facts, according to Rawls, we can be 
confident that everyone in the original position will choose principles of justice 
that, first of all, would guarantee an equal distribution of certain basic rights 
and liberties (freedom of thought and of conscience, freedom of movement and 
occupation, etc.) and of a certain minimum standard of income and wealth to 
everyone, as necessary conditions freely to form, revise and rationally pursue 
their own conception of the good life and to ensure equal respect to everyone’s 
point of view and way of life. Secondly, they will choose principles that would 
ensure an equal distribution of the benefits coming from social cooperation – 
unless doing otherwise will be to the advantage of everyone, or at least to the 
more disadvantaged members of society. Thus, the two principles of justice as 
fairness: 
 
       I. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system 
of equal basic  
       liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
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 II.  Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both:  
(a)  to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; and  
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity. (49) 
 
Each principle controls one of the two functions of justice which the governing 
institutions are in charge of; each gives expression to one of the two basic moral 
intuitions of justice as fairness, and is represented in the construction of the 
original position by one of the two sets of restraining conditions conveyed by 
the veil of ignorance; and each one stands in critical opposition to one of the 
two principal defects of the main current alternative conceptions of justice. 
The first principle controls the aspect of justice concerned with the assignment 
of fundamental rights and duties to citizens and gives expression to the moral 
conviction, behind the claim of the priority of the right over the good, that 
every person should be left free to pursue her own conception of the good as 
long as it does not interfere with the realization of the others’ plans of life, 
which is represented in the original position by the assumption of the parties’ 
ignorance of their own conceptions of the good. The conceptions of justice it 
opposes are the perfectionist ones, as exemplified by classical utilitarianism. 
According to Rawls, classical utilitarianism, as with any perfectionist doctrine, 
fails to recognize the priority of the right over the good. In particular it fails to 
abide by Kant’s precept always to treat human beings as ends in themselves 
and never as means. It fails to give an adequate account of the commonsense 
conviction that “each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare state as a whole cannot override”. Justice as fairness instead 
recognizes that 
 
justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by the greater 
good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few 
are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. 
Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as 
settled: the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining 
or to the calculus of social interests. (50) 
 
For this reason the first principle has to be given precedence over the second. 
In particular, Rawls believes that utilitarianism is led to ignore the primacy of 
the basic rights of citizens because, by incorrectly thinking that «as it is 
rational for one man to maximize the fulfilment of his system of desires, it is 
right for a society to maximize the net balance of satisfaction taken over all of 
its members», it is led «to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational 
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choice for one man», (51) thus failing to recognize the essential aspect of human 
existence underlying the primacy of justice, «the plurality and distinctiveness 
of individuals». 
The second principle of justice, which Rawls calls “the principle of difference”, 
controls instead the aspect of justice concerned with the «appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation», and gives 
expression to the other liberal moral intuition represented by the other 
constraint of the veil of ignorance, namely, that we should try to neutralize the 
inequalities in the initial distribution of natural and social assets when 
deliberating about justice. The conceptions of justice it opposes are those that, 
although usually belonging to the social contract family which Rawls praises, 
allow for factors due to natural contingencies and to social chance to influence 
the choice of principles for the correct distribution of social and economic 
benefits. Rawls’s targets here are two particular systems of justice. One is based 
on the principle of “natural liberty”, the other on the principle of “liberal 
equality.” 
The system of natural liberty, as it has been endorsed by intellectuals in the 
liberal tradition stemming from Hobbes, Locke, Bentham and Smith, like 
libertarian liberals such as Hayek and Nozick, regards as just any distribution 
resulting from a social organization based on free market economy and 
observing a formal (legal) equality of opportunity. For Rawls, «intuitively, the 
most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits 
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary 
from a moral point of view». (52) In fact, the distributive shares sanctioned by 
the principle of natural liberty tend to be a mere reproduction of the initial 
distribution of natural talents and social fortune, and thus they will be just only 
in so far as the initial distribution was just; which, as a matter of fact, is never 
the case.  
The system of liberal equality tries to remedy to these injustices by aiming at a 
“fair meritocracy.” The idea is to make the principle of equality of opportunity 
less formal by correcting the social inequalities between persons, so that those 
similarly talented may enjoy real equal opportunities. To Rawls the principle of 
liberal equality «intuitively still appears defective», too close to the libertarian 
predicament, because, «even if it works to perfection in eliminating the 
influence of social contingencies, it still permits the distribution of wealth and 
income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents», 
and «there is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to 
be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social 
fortune». (53) Both factors are equally arbitrary from a moral point of view.  
In order to obtain an adequate grasp of this point of view, justice as fairness 
postulates that the parties in the original situation do not know their social 
position and their fortune in the natural lottery, so that the principles of justice 
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to which they will give their allegiance will give expression to the intuitive idea 
of democratic equality as it is expressed by the principle of difference, «that the 
social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those 
better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate». (54) Only 
in this way will the governing institutions be able adequately to respect 
citizens’ freedom and equality and thus be considered legitimated, for no one 
could be reasonably asked to assent to terms of social cooperation that would 
disadvantage her more than other viable and reasonable alternatives. 
 
3.2. The original position and anti-foundationalism 
 
The epistemological criticism of Rawls’s construction of the original position 
points to the fact that the ignorance requirements of the original conditions 
have been appositely tailored in order to be able to derive the principles that 
Rawls was looking for from the outset. This criticism plays on the consideration 
that a circular justification is not a justification at all, and expresses the 
conviction that Rawls presented the idea of the original position as a heuristic 
procedure that could provide a rational foundation for his two principles of 
justice. Alas, the original position is not a device of justification at all, and 
Rawls does not intend to provide a foundational argument for his proposed 
principles of justice, as opposed to an ethnocentric one. 
Rawls is well aware that the conditions of the original position have been 
tailored ad hoc in order to obtain the two principles of justice as fairness. In A 
Theory of Justice, he admits that «there are many possible interpretations of the 
initial situation» and that «justice as fairness is but one of these»; (55) and he 
explicitly says that he wants «to define the original position so that we get the 
desired solution». (56) But this circularity does not bother him, because, as he 
has made repeatedly clear, the original position is not to be taken as a device of 
justification, but «is to be seen as a device of representation». (57) It must be 
seen as a device by means of which he can represent his liberal moral point of 
view and specify the considerations that he believes must be taken into account, 
and those that must not, for deciding the principles of justice for a society of 
free and equal citizens. As he says, «as a device of representation the idea of the 
original position serves as a means of public reflection and self-clarification. It 
helps us work out what we now think, once we are able to take a clear and 
uncluttered view of what justice requires when society is conceived as a scheme 
of cooperation between free and equal persons». (58) That is, it helps us 
 
[to model] what we regard – here and now – as fair conditions under which 
the representatives of free and equal citizens are to specify the terms of 
social cooperation in the case of the basic structure of society; and since it 
also models what, for this case, we regard as acceptable restrictions on 
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reasons available to the parties for favouring one political conception of 
justice over another, the conception of justice the parties would adopt 
identifies the conception of justice that we regard – here and now – as fair 
and supported by the best reasons. (59) 
 
Rawls is not trying, then, to use the original position as a foundational device 
for liberal ethics and politics. He «[is] not trying to find a conception of justice 
suitable for all societies, regardless of their particular social or historical 
circumstances». Rather, coherently with the holistic and ethnocentric 
conception of justification and the related conception of the aim of political 
philosophy that we have presented above, he is just trying «to settle a 
fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions within a 
democratic society under modern conditions», (60) by showing not that his 
conception of justice is «true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its 
congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and 
our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our 
public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us». (61)  «The real task», he 
says,  
 
is to discover and formulate the deeper bases of agreement which one hopes 
are embedded in common sense, or even to originate and fashion starting 
points for common understanding by expressing in a new form the 
convictions found in the historical tradition by connecting them with a wide 
range of people’s considerations: those which stand up to critical reflection. 
(62) 
 
And this task, he again makes clear, in a way reminiscent of the pragmatist 
conception of objectivity, «is not primarily an epistemological problem»: 
 
The search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our 
conception of ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the search for 
moral truth interpreted as fixed by prior and independent order of object 
and relations. (63) 
 
The original position serves as a means for accomplishing this task: «[it] serves 
as a mediating idea by which our considered convictions of all levels of 
generality are brought to bear on one another so as to achieve greater mutual 
agreement and self-understanding». (64) And, of course, «we have to concede 
that as established beliefs [and thus considered convictions] change, it is 
possible that the principles of justice which it seems rational to choose may 
likewise change». (65) There is no attempt, pace Sandel, at escaping tradition to 
reach the Archimedean point, no attempt at «distinguishing a standard of 
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appraisal from the thing being assessed» (66) in order to ground the cherished 
liberal practices sub specie aeternitatis. 
Even if Rawls uses the expression «Archimedean point» (67) to describe the 
standpoint of the original position, even if he says that «to see our place in 
society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis», 
we do not have to forget that he specifies that  
 
the perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond 
the world, nor the point of view of a transcendental being; rather it is a 
certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the 
world. Purity of heart, if one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to 
act with grace and self-command from this point of view. (68) 
 
These are the concluding sentences of A Theory of Justice, and they confirm the 
central point I have been making in this paper, that is, that Rawls’s conception 
of justice, and thus the device of the original position, elaborates just one moral 
conception amongst other different and conflicting moral conceptions. Indeed, 
as Rawls remarks, commenting on the proposal to include explicit moral 
motivations in the description of the parties to the initial situation, «it is a 
mistake to object that the notion of the original agreement would no longer be 
ethically neutral. For, this notion already includes moral features and must do 
so, for example, the formal conditions on principles and the veil of 
ignorance».(69) 
In particular, those concluding sentences make clear that the objectivity justice 
as fairness is after, the only objectivity with which, according to anti-
foundationalism, liberalism should be content, is objectivity intended as 
fairness, the objectivity we may obtain if we try to place ourselves in the 
original position; that is, if we try to adopt that certain form of thought and 
feeling, that certain moral sensibility, which does not regard the facts that we 
occupy a particular social position, that we hold a particular comprehensive 
doctrine and a particular conception of the good, and that we are endowed with 
particular natural characteristics and abilities, as constituting morally and 
politically appropriate reasons to be taken in consideration when deliberating 
on matters of justice – e.g., on the appropriate assignment of rights, duties and 
distributive shares. This is a moral objectivity, not an epistemological one, and 
saying this is the same as saying that the original position has not been 
envisaged as a justificatory device but as a normative one. 
The belief that Rawls, by proposing the idea of the original position, was trying 
to provide a definitive argument for a certain conception of justice has been 
thought to be supported not only by his reference – arguably inopportune but 
in any case innocuous once contextualized – to the Archimedean point, but also 
by the apparent rationalist aspect of the idea of the original position. This 
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aspect is taken to be manifested in the fact that the choice of principles of 
justice by the parties to the original position is presented as an instance of a 
solution to a problem of rational decision; and to be further confirmed by 
Rawls’s assertion that «the theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most 
important part, of the theory of rational choice», following the seemingly even 
more compromising claim that «the merit of a contract terminology is that it 
conveys the idea that the principles of justice may be conceived as principles 
that would be chosen by rational persons, and that in this way conceptions of 
justice may be explained and justified». (70) 
However, even if we admit that this is a somewhat lax way of speaking for an 
anti-foundationalist, we should not forget that Rawls is talking from the 
standpoint of a conception of justification according to which «to justify a 
conception of justice to someone is to give him a proof of its principles from 
premises that we both accept, [these principles having in turn consequences 
that match our considered judgements]»; that is, a conception of justification 
according to which «proofs become justification [only] once the starting points 
are mutually recognized». (71) This means that Rawls is well aware that the 
rational choice of the parties to the original position will sound rational, and 
thus an argument for the chosen principles of justice, only to those who share 
the same liberal form of thought and feeling as the parties of his device of 
representation. As he says, 
 
the essential agreement in judgments of justice arises not from recognition 
of a prior and independent moral order, but from everyone’s affirmation of 
the same authoritative social perspective. (72) 
 
In other words, Rawls is aware that, since in the real world we face the choice of 
principles of justice with full knowledge of our natural talents, our conceptual 
and moral setting, and our social position, it will not be irrational per se – as 
opposed to immoral – for someone to choose principles which would be to her 
advantage, even if they will make some other citizens worse off. He is aware 
that for real people to choose the liberal principles he proposes, to accept to 
enter into the conditions of the original position, they must already share the 
same moral convictions represented by the veil of ignorance, that is, that people 
should be left as free to pursue their own conceptions of the good as is consistent 
with an equal freedom for everyone, and they should be treated as equal 
without natural and social fortune influencing the distribution of the benefits of 
social cooperation. Rawls is aware that his two principles of justice will be 
accepted only by reasonable people, people who have agreed to abide by the 
dictates of freedom and equality, and thus by the collectively endorsed terms of 
social cooperation. 
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But, as we know, Rawls has no thought of deriving the reasonable from the 
rational. He believes that «any plausible derivation must situate rational agents 
in circumstances in which they are subject to certain appropriate conditions 
and these conditions will express the reasonable». (73) And this is exactly what 
he does: ethnocentrically conceiving of reasonable conditions as the conditions 
of a pluralist and democratic society committed to the respect of everyone’s 
freedom and equality, (74) and trying to give adequate expression to them by 
looking for «a description of the initial situation that yields principles which 
match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted», incessantly going 
back and forth in the holistic swing of the reflective equilibrium, «sometimes 
altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing 
our judgments and conforming them to the principles».(75) This is the only 
possible way of proceeding, since «there is no set of conditions or first principles 
that can be plausibly claimed to be necessary or definitive of morality and 
thereby especially suited to carry the burden of justification». (76) This burden 
can be carried only by the ethnocentric, conversational and holistic procedure 
aiming at «the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting 
together into a coherent view». 
Looking back at his initial formulation of the derivation of the principles of 
justice from the construction of the original position Rawls admits that it would 
have been better not to have said that the theory of justice is a part of the 
theory of rational decision. «What should have been said», he now clarifies, 
 
is that the account of the parties, and of their reasoning, uses the theory of 
rational decision, though only in an intuitive way. This theory is itself part 
of a political conception of justice, one that tries to give an account of 
reasonable principles of justice. There is no thought of deriving those 
principles from the concept of rationality as the sole normative concept. 
 
Yet he still believes that «the text of Theory as a whole supports this 
interpretation». (77) I have been trying to show that this is indeed the case. 
In his later works, however, Rawls prefers to drop any talk of theory of rational 
decision and to rely less heavily on the construction of the original position. 
Indeed, he seems to have realized that as a device of representation it lent itself 
to too many misreadings and that it would be better to replace it with a more 
direct and concrete way of expressing the moral and political intuitions that he 
tried to systematize by its means. The normative concept of “public reason”, 
which I have already introduced as «the reason of equal citizens who, as a 
collective body, exercise a final political and coercive power over another in 
enacting laws and in amending their constitution», (78) fulfils this substitutive 
function. 
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Built into the concept of “public reason” is the same moral stance we found at 
the basis of that certain form of thought and feeling that the original position was 
intended to convey. Purity of heart, in the same sense of fairness, we could now 
say, ‘would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-command in 
accordance with the dictates of public reason.’ In fact, the idea of public reason, 
just as with the epistemic and motivational constraints on the parties in the 
original position, expresses the condition of reasonableness necessary for 
reaching a fair agreement on the principles of justice between free and equal 
persons. It expresses the ideal of democratic citizenship, «the ideal of 
democratic citizens trying to conduct their political affairs on terms supported 
by public values that we might reasonably expect others to endorse». (79) 
Indeed, the core of public reason is the principle of reciprocity, according to 
which  
 
Our exercise of power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by 
other citizens as a justification of those actions. (80) 
 
 
The idea of public reason thus answers the problem of political legitimacy for a 
liberal society in exactly the same egalitarian spirit of the construction of the 
original position. Political decisions are collectively binding, i.e. legitimated, 
when they are justifiable to all citizens bound by them, regarded as free and 
equal persons. Both the idea of the original position and that of public reason 
yield the same liberal principle of political legitimacy. 
There is therefore no substantial difference between the central idea of Rawls’s 
original formulation of justice as fairness and that central to his later 
formulation. The change reflects Rawls’s willingness to obviate any 
misunderstanding about the epistemological intent behind the elaboration of 
his conception of justice. This does not aim at giving a rational foundation to 
liberal ethics and politics; it just wants to express a particular stance in the 
debate within liberalism over the best way to realize in our pluralist society the 
respect for everyone’s freedom and equality. Public reason, with its explicit 
moral and political injunctions incorporated into it, makes the ethnocentric 
endorsement of this moral and political stance more perspicuous and less 
artificial than the idea of the original position. 
 
 
3.3. The original position and democratic deliberation 
 
However, by elaborating the concept of public reason Rawls not only wanted to 
state more clearly his distance from foundational philosophy, he also wanted to 
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answer the other kind of criticism which I wish to consider, that concerned with 
the political significance of the original position. This criticism focuses on the 
form that political deliberation on the principles of justice takes when viewed 
through the device of the original position. Indeed, so the criticism goes, in 
justice as fairness properly speaking there is no political deliberation at all, if by 
this term we intend what we normally intend (at least ideally) for it in the 
everyday practice of politics, namely, the collective give-and-take of moral 
arguments on matters of controversial political and moral issues. For example, 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson observe that, even if Rawls «argues 
cogently for the values of citizenship and participation in politics», 
 
When [he] considers how to make the principles of justice more specific, he 
does not propose that citizens or their representatives discuss moral 
disagreement about these principles in public forums. Although his theory 
of constitutional democracy leaves room for such discussion, it emphasizes 
instead a solitary process of reflection, a kind of private deliberation. He 
suggests that each of us alone perform an intricate thought experiment in 
which a veil of ignorance obscures our own personal interests, including our 
own conception of the good life, and compels us to judge on a more 
impersonal basis. (81) 
 
The same point has been made by Brian Barry who argues, following Hart’s 
statement that within Rawls’s system we are concerned with what «no rational 
person bargaining with others on a footing of equality could agree to», that  
 
Rawls’s original position does not have any room for bargaining with others 
– on a footing of equality or any other footing. There can be no bargaining 
among people who, even though they actually have conflicting ends, do not 
know what those ends are. The whole idea of bargaining thus becomes 
inapplicable and the choice of principles reduces to a choice by anyone in 
the original position picked at random … We might as well talk of 
computers having the same program and fed the same input reaching an 
agreement.  (82) 
 
Barry’s conclusion is that Rawls is in this way «open to precisely the charges 
that he levels against ‘impartial spectator’ theories of ethics: he ‘does not take 
seriously the plurality or distinctiveness of individuals’ nor does he ‘recognize as 
the basis of justice that to which men would consent.’ For it is perfectly open to 
someone to say ‘I accept that if I were making the kind of decision stipulated in 
the original position I would have chosen x; but that has no relevance to what I 
can reasonably be asked to agree here and now’». (83) Therefore his theory of 
justice «fails to accommodate [his] fundamental egalitarian idea that principles 
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of justice have to be acceptable above all to those who stand to do least well 
under them». (84) 
Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson conclude that, by placing all the weight of 
the derivation of his principles of justice on the solitary deliberation of the 
original position, Rawls compromises his initial egalitarian intentions, because 
«citizens cannot maintain a stable commitment to principles of 
justice…without extensive deliberation in public forums about the meaning of 
constitutional principles and their implications for specific decisions of 
government». (85) For it is only «by making democracy more deliberative 
[that] citizens stand a better chance of resolving some of their moral 
disagreements, and living with those that will inevitably persist, on terms that 
all can accept». (86) 
Although it is undeniably true that within the original position no actual 
process of collective deliberation takes place, I believe that these criticisms miss 
the point behind Rawls’s construction of the initial situation. Like the 
previously considered charge of circularity, these criticisms “from deliberation” 
fail to appreciate that the original position is only a device of representation. In 
particular, these criticisms forget that the original position never pretended to 
be a description of how political deliberation is, or should be, effectively 
conducted. In fact, Rawls never fails to remind us that «the original position is 
a purely hypothetical situation. Nothing resembling it needs ever to take 
place»; (87) that the contract between people placed behind the veil of 
ignorance «must be regarded as both hypothetical and nonhistorical» since «we 
do not suppose that the agreement has ever [been], or indeed ever could 
actually be entered into». (88) 
The construction of the original position serves only as a figurative way to 
convey the moral commitment that Rawls believes citizenship in a pluralist, 
free and egalitarian society demands. It is a thought experiment by means of 
which Rawls wants to communicate to us the moral and political injunction 
that we should regard our natural and social assets, our interests and our 
conceptions of the good, as morally and politically inadequate considerations 
when deciding on matters of justice and of common concern. It is «an 
expository device which sums up the meaning of [the constraints that we are 
prepared to regard as limits on fair terms of social cooperation] and helps us to 
extract their consequences». (89) And, as Barry himself notes, «there is nothing 
wrong with the idea that we can throw light on what is fair by asking questions 
about what we might think in hypothetical situations». (90) 
It seems, then, that Barry shares to some degree the same «incapacity to 
appreciate the force of hypotheticals» that he himself imputes to Rawls’s 
critics. Like Henry Phelps Brown, whom Barry rightly mocks for writing that 
«it is hard to see why an engagement that appears rational, and binding, to a 
person of one kind, allowed very limited information should continue to be 
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acceptable or to be binding upon that person when he and all others like him 
have been greatly changed and are altogether better informed», (91) thus not 
seeing that for Rawls «the only point of the original position» was to make 
demands on real people, he himself seems to be «apparently incapable of 
recognizing that Rawls, [through the hypothetical device of the original 
position] invites people to put themselves in others’ shoes in order to 
concentrate their minds on what they should think is fair while wearing their 
own shoes». (92) 
It is therefore incorrect to argue, as Barry, Gutmann and Thompson do, from 
the solitary nature of political deliberation within the framework of the original 
position the absence from Rawls’s conception of justice of any commitment 
towards spaces of collective deliberation over matters of common interest, and 
thus his blindness towards a necessary condition for political legitimacy in a 
society free and equal persons. This is not to deny that A Theory of Justice fails 
adequately to stress the importance of – and indeed gives little attention to – 
the concrete collective deliberative practices of public decision-making in a 
pluralist society. In fact, Rawls introduces the concept of public reason 
precisely in order to give to his conception of justice a worldlier and more 
practice-oriented moral and political outlook, and to give within justice as 
fairness a more central space to moments of collective deliberation. Yet, we 
cannot ignore that already built into the device of the original position was the 
moral and political injunction central to the later development of theories of 
deliberative democracy such as those advanced by Gutmann and Thompson 
and by Barry themselves. This is the injunction that Rawls, in Political 
Liberalism, placed at the basis of the idea of public reason in the form of the 
principle of reciprocity: namely, the injunction that citizens,  
 
as reasonable and rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of 
reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines, should be ready to explain 
the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably 
expect that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and 
equality. (93) 
 
As Gutmann and Thomson explain, «this disposition to seek mutually 
justifiable reasons expresses the core of the process of deliberation». And just as 
for Rawls, for them too the main motivation behind this disposition is the quest 
for political legitimacy. «Deliberative democracy», they say, «asks citizens and 
officials to justify public policy by giving reasons that can be accepted by those 
who are bound by it». (94) 
Joshua Cohen, another key figure in the development of deliberative 
conceptions of democracy, expresses the key tenet of his position in similar 
terms to those used by Rawls. «The conception of [political] justification that 
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provides the core of the ideal of deliberative democracy», he writes, «can be 
captured by an ideal procedure of political deliberation».In such a procedure 
participants regard one another as equals; they aim to defend and criticize 
institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others have reason to 
accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the assumption that those 
others are reasonable; and they are prepared to cooperate in accordance with 
the results of such discussion, treating the results as authoritative. (95) In A 
Theory of Justice this disposition of reciprocity was contained in the idea that in 
a well-ordered liberal society, a society regulated by a public liberal conception 
of justice, 
 
the members are, and view themselves as, free and equal moral persons … 
they each have, and view themselves as having, fundamental aims and 
interests in the name of which they think it legitimate to make claims on 
one another; and they each have, and view themselves as having, a right to 
equal respect and consideration in determining the principles by which the 
basic structures of their society is to be governed.  
 
Indeed, the original position, as Rawls clarifies immediately afterwards, «is 
specified to embody the appropriate reciprocity and equality between persons 
so conceived». (96) Indeed, the injunction of reciprocity is contained in the 
fundamental idea behind the construction of the contractual circumstances of 
the original position. This is the very same idea that Barry places at the basis of 
his conception of “justice as impartiality”, i.e. «that just rules are those that 
can be freely endorsed by people on a footing of equality». (97) 
I hence believe that we can confidently conclude that both the role of 
reciprocity as the guiding principle of public discussion and the role of fair and 
free public discussion as the guiding principle of political justification have 
always been central elements of Rawls’s justice as fairness. Although we can 
certainly agree with Barry that the idea of the original position does not do any 
essential work in the construction of justice as fairness – as Rawls himself has 
acknowledged, after all, by replacing “public reason” for “the original position” 
as his central idea – and that what Rawls is really asking is after all, in a way 
similar to Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist construction, (98) «whether or not a 




3.4. The original position and self-reflexive deliberation 
 
By showing the anti-foundationalist and deliberative character of Rawls’s 
justice as fairness I thus think we can confidently attribute to it the 
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commitment to the value which I regard as fundamental for the fuller respect of 
people’s freedom and equality, i.e. that of leaving the established interpretation 
and application of the requirements of justice open to public discussion and 
revision. Jeremy Waldron, though, has questioned this point, maintaining that 
Rawls fails to draw from his ‘burdens-of-judgment’ argument for a reasonable 
plurality of comprehensive conceptions of the good the conclusion that «for the 
same reason, in a well-ordered society, reasonable people might be expected to 
disagree fundamentally about the basic terms and principles of their 
association», (100) thereby failing «to deal with justice-pluralism and 
disagreement about rights». (101)  
Waldron’s argument is based on what I believe to be an incorrect reading of 
Rawls’s injunction to follow the demands of public reason when dealing with 
matters of justice. He takes it as presupposing that an agreement on the 
fundamentals of justice must be already realized in our societies when we 
engage in public discussions, whereas I believe it must be taken as a moral 
injunction to strive towards reaching such an agreement. The centrality played 
in Rawls’s conception of public reason by the normative principle of reciprocity 
for me clearly shows that Rawls takes public reason as a normative ideal, as a 
moral telos which persons holding different and conflicting conception of the 
good and of the right should strive for in order to bring our societies nearer to 
the liberal ideal of a well-ordered society of free and equal persons. This can be 
clearly evinced, for instance, by Rawls’s assertion that   
 
the limits of public reason are not, clearly, the limits of law or statute but 
the limits we honor when we honor an ideal: the ideal of democratic citizens 
trying to conduct their political affairs on terms supported by public values 
that we might reasonable expect others to endorse. (102) 
 
However, even leaving aside the correct interpretation of Rawls’s conception of 
public reason, I do not see how, in the light of the many passages in which 
Rawls acknowledges the plurality of reasonable conceptions of justice and of 
fundamental rights, it can be plausibly believed that Rawls overlooks the fact 
that «pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines 
is not the only pluralism with which we have to deal in a modern democratic 
society». (103) For example, when we dealt with the charge that the conditions 
of the original position have been tailored ad hoc in view of the two principles of 
justice, we saw that Rawls, already in A Theory of Justice, had no problem in 
admitting that «there are many possible interpretations of the initial situation» 
and that «justice as fairness is but one of these». We also saw that, in the same 
book, coherent with his ethnocentric and holistic conception of justification as 
consisting of a reflective equilibrium between our theorizations and our 
established beliefs, he maintained that «we have to concede that as established 
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beliefs change, it is possible that the principles of justice which it seems rational 
to choose may likewise change».  
In Political Liberalism, the work on which Waldron bases his argument, Rawls 
is even more explicit on the plurality of reasonable conceptions of justice. He 
states, for instance: «The view I have called justice as fairness is but one 
example of a liberal political conception; its specific content is not definitive of 
such a view». (104) Furthermore, and more significantly, he clarifies his 
conception of public reason by claiming that 
 
It is crucial that public reason is not specified by any one political 
conception of justice, certainly not by justice as fairness alone. Rather, its 
content – the principles, ideals, and standards that may be applied to – are 
those of a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice and this 
family changes over time. These political conceptions are not of course 
compatible and they may be revised as a result of their debates with one 
another. Social changes over generations also give rise to new groups with 
different political problems…The content of public reason is not fixed any 
more than it is defined by any one reasonable political conception. (105) 
 
This passage, in which we can find stated both the anti-foundationalist and 
deliberative character of justice as fairness, makes particularly clear that Rawls 
wholly acknowledges the fact raised by such criticisms as advanced by 
Waldron, but also Gray and Bellamy (106) for example, namely that 
specifications of basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, assignments of a 
special priority to these rights, liberties, and opportunities, and decisions of 
measures assuring all citizens adequate well-purpose means to make effective 
use of their basic liberties and opportunities «can be seen in different ways, so 
there are many liberalisms». (107) 
As we have already observed, Rawls’s intention was to take a particular stance 
within the debate internal to liberalism. His has been an attempt to systematize 
certain intuitions about the set of rights, liberties, and principles regulating 
their relative priority, that can best realize in pluralist societies the respect for 
people’s freedom and equality, and thus legitimize governing institutions, 
without ever forgetting that his represents only a particular interpretation of 
freedom, equality and political legitimacy among other different but equally 
reasonable interpretations. I think we can confidently say that Rawls’s justice 
as fairness does not aim, as Gray believes, at being «insulated from conflict of 
value»; (108) at giving «a prescription for an universal regime» (109) based «on 
a rational consensus on the best way of life». (110) It does not aim at «the 
construction of the just society sub specie aeternitatis», (111) as Bellamy 
believes. There is no attempt, pace Sandel, at «distinguishing a standard of 
appraisal from the thing being assessed» (112) in order to ground his favoured 
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principles of justice on the Archimedean point of view. Of the two horns of the 
dilemma that the justification of principles of justice presents us with, the 
Humean one which wants us to derive the principles «from the values or 
conceptions of the good current in society», and the Kantian one which makes 
us look for «a standard external to the values and interests prevailing in 
societies», (113) Rawls is happy, pace Sandel, to grasp the former ethnocentric 
one.  
Returning to Sandel’s criticism of Rawls with which I started my reflections, I 
want to observe how the dilemma of justification on which Sandel bases his 
charges is just a particular instance of the fundamental dilemma of 
epistemology: either abandoning ourselves to an infinite regress of justifying 
reasons or accepting instead the unavoidable circularity of justification. This is 
not the place to formulate a viable anti-foundationalist epistemology defending 
it from the charges of corrosive relativism. I just limit myself here to observing 
that the fear of circularity is a typical expression of the foundational conviction 
that if you do not have a neutral ground upon which to place your cherished 
values and beliefs then you do not have any valid reason at all to endorse them. 
Sandel shows that he shares this fear and this conviction when, in presenting us 
with the dilemma arising from the justification of principles of justice, he takes 
for granted that Rawls is, in some way, trying to escape from it. In fact the 
conviction behind this assumption is that to grasp the first, circular, option 
would condemn our values and beliefs to arbitrariness as much as if we would 
grasp the second, infinitely receding option. (114) 
However, as I have shown, Rawls in formulating his conception of justice is not 
trying to reach that Archimedean point which would permit us to break the 
dilemma of epistemology, since, like anti-foundationalist philosophers such as 
Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, he does not think that that dilemma is a 
genuine one. He does not think that the contingency of the bases on which our 
justifications stand is something we should worry about; that to accept the 
contingency of our positions forces us to embrace the corrosive conclusions of 
relativism. Rather, he endorses and defends the values and practices of the 
liberal tradition, accepting at the same time their metaphysical neutrality and 
immanency. In particular, with the description of the original position he does 
not try to give them a metaphysical back-up, but only to contribute to their 
clearer formulation. I am therefore inclined to think that behind Sandel’s belief 
in the foundationalist spirit of Rawls’s deontological liberalism there lies the 
foundationalist assumption that if you are not able to give such an absolute 
backup to your values and beliefs than you cannot claim their priority; from 
which follows the conviction that, if Rawls is willing to claim the priority of 
justice as fairness over other conceptions of the good and of the right, he must 
be trying to secure that priority on absolute foundations. 
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4. The Law of Peoples: a multicultural path to cosmopolitanism? 
 
Rawls in The Law of Peoples (115) turns to apply his liberal conception of 
justice «to the principles and norms of international law and practice», (116) 
trying to «work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably 
just liberal people» (117) taking into account the historical fact of the diversity 
of cultures and traditions of thought among the different peoples of the world. 
Rawls’s preoccupation is «to specify how far liberal peoples are to tolerate 
nonliberal peoples», (118) starting from the consideration that 
 
If all societies were required to be liberal, then the idea of political 
liberalism would fail to express due toleration for other acceptable ways (if 
such there are, as I assume) of ordering society. We recognize that a liberal 
society is to respect its citizens’ comprehensive doctrines – religious, 
philosophical, and moral – provided that these doctrines are pursued in 
ways compatible with a reasonable political conception of justice and its 
public reason. Similarly, we say that, provided a nonliberal society’s basic 
institutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and justice 
and lead its people to honor reasonable and just law for the Society of 
Peoples, a liberal people is to tolerate and accept that society. (119) 
 
Rawls calls these non-liberal societies complying with basic requirement of 
liberal justice and with international laws, «in the absence of a better term», 
«decent peoples».  
Just as with the normative idea of reasonableness, he does not believe there 
could be a precise definition of decency from which we could deduce a clear-cut 
set of criteria. Furthermore, just as he believes in there being different kinds of 
liberal peoples interpreting the notion of reasonableness in different ways, he 
believes that there may be different kinds of decent peoples. Thus he regards 
the kind of decent people that he takes into consideration as one among many 
possible ones. The one kind which, in his usual pragmatist fashion, conforms to 
the way he thinks “decency” is used within a liberal democratic culture. (120) 
What then are the basic criteria of justice a people should meet in order to be 
considered decent? 
Without going into the details of his definition of ‘decency’ Rawls believes that 
decent peoples are those non-aggressive societies that honour the laws of peace 
and respect the political and social order of other societies, that secure human 
rights for all their members and in which their system of law and their public 
servants follow a common good idea of justice that takes into account the 
fundamental interests of everyone in society. (121) Decent peoples are also 
characterized by associationist social structures and by what Rawls calls a 
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“decent consultation hierarchy.” That is, as he puts it, «the members of these 
societies are viewed in public life as members of different groups, and each 
group is represented in the legal system by a body in a decent consultation 
hierarchy». (122) This hierarchy he regards as satisfying six guidelines: 
 
First, all groups must be consulted. Second, each member of a people must 
belong to a group. Third, each group must be represented by a body that 
contains at least some of the group’s own members who know and share the 
fundamental interests of the group. The first three conditions ensure that 
the fundamental interests of all groups are consulted and taken into 
account. Fourth, the body that makes the final decision must weigh the 
views and claims of each of the bodies consulted, and, if called upon, judges 
and other officials must explain and justify the rulers’ decision. In the spirit 
of the procedure, consultation with each body may influence the outcome. 
Fifth, the decision should be made according to a conception of the special 
priorities [of the people] … Sixth and last – but highly important – these 
special priorities must fit into an overall scheme of cooperation, and the fair 
terms according to which the group’s cooperation is to be conducted should 
be explicitly specified. (123)  
 
Besides liberal and decent peoples Rawls see the world inhabited by ‘outlaw 
states’, ‘burdened societies’, and ‘benevolent absolutism.’ «While a benevolent 
absolutism does respect to a certain extent human rights, it is not a well ordered 
society, since it does not give its members a meaningful role in making political 
decisions». (124) That is, it lacks a decent consultation hierarchy. Burdened 
societies are those societies that because of unfavourable historical, social and 
economic circumstances are not able to achieve a well-ordered regime, whether 
liberal or decent. Outlaw states are instead those regimes that do not respect 
the human rights of their members and are aggressive towards other peoples. 
(125) 
According to Rawls the society of peoples guided by liberal laws can and should 
comprise only liberal and decent peoples, that is, those peoples that in their 
relations towards each other and towards their members are guided by 
considerations of reasonableness and thus respect the reciprocity principle. 
Indeed, the motivation behind Rawls’s choice of peoples rather than states as 
the relevant political and moral subjects of international relations is exactly 
that of «distinguishing [his] thinking from that about political states as 
traditionally conceived, with their powers of sovereignty included in the 
(positive) international law for the three centuries after the Thirty Years’ War», 
namely «the right to go to war in pursuit of state policies with the ends of 
politics given by a state’s rational prudential interests…and a certain 
autonomy in dealing with its own people». (126) The main normative idea 
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behind his formulation of principles of liberal justice at the global level is 
precisely «to reformulate the powers of sovereignty in light of a reasonable Law 
of Peoples and deny to states the traditional rights to war and to unrestricted 
internal autonomy». (127) He thus focuses on peoples, conceived as persons 
sharing the same reasonably just institutional, cultural and political-moral 
environment, (128) as the subjects to place in the original position to be acted 
out at the global level. 
To conclude my sketchy presentation of Rawls’s conception of the Law of 
Peoples let us look at the principles of international justice that he believes 
liberal and decent peoples will come to agree once when the veil of ignorance 
drops down. These, which he takes «from the history and usages of 
international law and practices», are the following eight «familiar and 
traditional principles»: (129) 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence 
are to be respected by other peoples; 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings; 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them; 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention; 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defense; 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights; 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war; 
        8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable 
conditions that    prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime. (130) 
 
Andrew Kuper in his Democracy Beyond Borders (131) has advanced a powerful 
argument against Rawls’s application of his political conception of justice to 
the international sphere. He believes that when he passes to the global level 
Rawls betrays the liberal attribution of primary moral significance to 
individuals. The key mistake for Kuper is Rawls’s choice to take peoples, rather 
than individuals, as the politically relevant subjects to place in the global 
original position. According to Kuper, Rawls’s commitment to constrain states’ 
sovereignty by considerations of reasonableness and decency is not enough to 
protect individuals’ «democratic rights and obligations». (132) Kuper, that is, 
thinks that decent peoples are not decent enough, and that when Rawls comes 
to extend toleration from within liberal communities to decent peoples «he 
seeks toleration of the wrong kind. Only an original position that includes all the 
persons of the world as free and equal persons can express toleration in the right 
way», (133) namely, in the liberal way.  
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Kuper’s argument is that the tolerance manifested by decent peoples towards 
the traditions, views and practices of their members is not compatible with 
liberal tolerance. «Liberal tolerance expresses ethical neutrality, by remaining 
impartial between particular moral conceptions of the good; for this very 
reason, liberalism must reject any political neutrality, that is, neutrality in 
respect of justification of coercion». (134) Kuper refers to Rawls’s own 
conception of toleration in Political Liberalism according to which a state 
should be neutral towards comprehensive views of the world.  
 
It is the essence of a politically liberal regulatory framework that it 
expresses toleration by not incorporating any comprehensive doctrine in the 
principles of justice; to fail to do so is not to extend but rather to eliminate 
liberal tolerance. In LP, on the other hand, he is mistaken. Decent peoples 
are not ethically neutral, nor is a Law of People which recognizes their 
comprehensive doctrine ethically neutral; thus at neither stage is there any 
basis for saying that what is being expressed counts as liberal toleration. 
(135) 
 
Kuper’s preoccupation is that Rawls by trying to take cultural pluralism 
seriously, stretching liberal toleration to decent non-liberal people, «does so by 
not taking seriously the reasonable pluralism of individual persons». (136) His 
reasonable Law of Peoples would thus unreasonably have serious anti-liberal 
consequences, for «dissenting individuals with liberal views would surely, it 
seems, dispute the idea that accommodation of reasonable pluralism requires 
that their individual moral claims be taken less seriously». (137) In particular, 
the problem with decent societies is that their decent consultation hierarchy 
«does not allow free speech», as «one could not really know what [dissenting 
individuals] would think, since their views could well be sealed off from view by 
the decent consultation hierarchy». (138) Sure, decent peoples, as Rawls has 
characterized them, «ensure that fundamental interests of all groups are 
consulted and taken into account», as well as guaranteeing space for dissent, 
public accountability for its civil servants, and transparency of public 
procedures and decision-making. Yet, Kuper argues, «citizens must argue 
within the conceptual terms of the regime, and only through representative of 
the groups; this closes off large domains and numerous types of discussion», the 
most serious being that «it prevents proper critical discussion of how the rules 
of discussion might be altered». (139) 
Here we reach the core of the disagreement, and the key issue to be dealt with 
in order to assess Rawls’s The Law of Peoples with regard to the liberal 
commitment to the priority of individual autonomy as expressed in A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism. Are decent peoples decent enough? Are they to 
be tolerated by liberals? Indeed these are the very questions that motivate The 
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Law of Peoples, and we know that Rawls’s moral intuitions tell us that we 
should answer them in the affirmative. Yet, is he right? Is he not relaxing too 
much the liberal criteria of toleration? Kuper believes so. In order to assess the 
normative import of Rawls’s conception of international justice I believe we 
should try to grasp the source of the disagreement. We should see, then, first all 
whether Kuper is getting Rawls’s description of decent peoples wrong or right.  
If he is mistaken about the extent to which Rawls’s decent societies curb the 
social and political rights of their members, and in particular of those who 
dissent from the ruling conception of the good, then their normative 
disagreement would disappear and Rawls’s intention would be that to 
accommodate within liberalism the importance attached by individuals to their 
culture and community: to accommodate, that is, cosmopolitanism with 
multiculturalism in the full respect of everyone’s individual autonomy. If 
Kuper, though, gets Rawls’s conception of decency right, then their 
disagreement would be a question of a clash of different moral and political 
intuitions about how to be liberal, and the further crucial question would raise: 
What is the motivational basis of Rawls’s toleration of decent peoples, 
normative or pragmatic? In other words, is Rawls really surrendering 
individuals’ rights to the normative priority accorded to a culture, thereby 
abandoning a cosmopolitan ethos, or is he only raising a pragmatic point 
concerning the concrete reality which liberal peoples have to face?  
I believe that Kuper gets Rawls both wrong and right, and that behind Rawls’s 
extension of justice as fairness to the international arena there lie both 
pragmatic considerations external to the normative core of liberalism and 
normative considerations internal to the concept of liberal toleration. The 
reason behind this ambivalence and ambiguity, I believe, is Rawls’s anti-
foundationalist awareness, as expressed in his conviction that there is not a 
single correct form of liberalism, a single correct interpretation of liberal 
reasonableness, toleration, freedom and equality and practices implementing 
these values and principles. «Liberal societies», he reminds us,  
 
may differ widely in many ways: for example some are far more egalitarian 
than others. Yet these differences are tolerated in the society of liberal 
peoples. Might not the institutions of some kinds of hierarchical societies 
also be similarly tolerable? I believe this to be so. (140) 
 
Here it is made manifest how at the centre of Rawls’s preoccupation with 
liberal international toleration is his anti-foundationalist awareness that it is 
not possible to define a priori the normative and institutional limits of a liberal 
society, ‘to deduce the reasonable from the rational’, and as a consequence, that 
also is not possible to establish clear-cut limits between liberal and non-liberal 
peoples. Surely, there are behaviours that are unquestionably unacceptable 
 36
such as those of outlaw regimes «that think a sufficient reason to engage in war 
is that war advances, or might advance, the regime’s rational (not reasonable) 
interests» (141) and that do not respect those universal human rights whose 
«political (moral) force extends to all societies» and that «are binding on all 
peoples and societies, including outlaw states». (142) And Rawls is unshakable 
in his condemnation of these states. «An outlaw state that violates these rights 
is to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful sanctions 
and even intervention», and «this refusal to tolerate those states is a 
consequence of liberalism and decency». 
 
If the political conception of political liberalism is sound, and if the steps we 
have taken in developing the Law of Peoples are also sound, then liberal 
and decent peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, not to tolerate 
outlaw states. Liberal and decent peoples have extremely good reasons for 
their attitude. Outlaw states are aggressive and dangerous; all peoples are 
safer and more secure if such states change, or are forced to change, their 
ways. Otherwise, they deeply affect the international climate of power and 
violence. (143) 
 
Yet, in the grey area that divides liberal and non-liberal peoples how can 
anyone possibly be so certain to recommend a liberal foreign policy of political 
and economical sanctions or forcible interventions, aimed at «gradually 
shap[ing] all not yet liberal societies in a liberal direction, until eventually (in 
the ideal case) all societies are liberal»? (144) «This foreign policy simply 
assumes that only a liberal democratic people can be acceptable». (145) This is 
the question behind Rawls’s reflections on international justice: «how do we 
know, before trying to work out a reasonable Law of Peoples, that nonliberal 
societies are always, other things being equal, the proper object of political 
sanctions?» (146) 
Following the conviction that «denying respect to other peoples and their 
members requires strong reasons to be justified», (147) Rawls then is only 
asking himself whether we should withhold respect to decent peoples, given 
that, even though Kuper is right that their «ideas of justice allow basic 
inequalities among their members (for example, some members may not be 
granted equal liberty of conscience)» (148), still  
 
Liberal peoples cannot say that decent peoples deny human rights…; nor 
can liberal peoples say that decent peoples deny their members the right to 
be consulted or a substantial political role in making decision…Finally, 
decent peoples allow a right of dissent, and government and judicial officials 
are required to give a respectful reply… Dissenters may not be dismissed as 
simply incompetent or lacking in understanding. In this and other ways, 
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the common good conception of justice held by decent peoples may 
gradually change over time, prodded by dissents of members of these 
peoples. (149)  
 
Indeed, these hypothetical decent peoples as described by Rawls seem far more 
decent than most of the real societies that describe themselves as liberal 
democracies. Still, Rawls’s fundamental concern is the following: even if decent 
peoples are not complying with liberal ideal principles and practices, are they so 
bad as to be sanctioned? Kuper is correct in stressing that the inequalities with 
regard to freedom of speech and conscience «are serious restrictions on liberty 
which would horrify a liberal at home, and it is not apparent that they should 
not be less horrifying when perpetrated against people that are not part of one’s 
liberal society». He is correct, of course, if he speaks of ideal liberal societies and 
peoples. And, always staying on ideal ground – this has always been our ground 
of reflection after all –, Kuper is also right when he continues the passage just 
quoted by observing that the seriousness of these infringements to freedom and 
equality «would certainly be apparent to parties in a single global original 
position who, when the veil lifts, might find themselves in a non-liberal 
society». (150) Yet again, are these infringements so serious as to sanction these 
peaceful societies that respect basic economic, social and political rights, as 
opposed to constructively relating with them? Rawls never affirms that 
considerations of reciprocal respect, as he introduces them in the international 
original position, forbid rational dialogue and debate between liberal and decent 
peoples, just as they do not forbid rational confrontation between different 
liberal societies. Also he never denies the moral and political superiority of the 
liberal commitment to the normative primacy of individual autonomy. Rawls’s 
answer to our last question can thus be found in the following passage:  
 
Liberal peoples must try to encourage decent peoples and not frustrate their 
vitality by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal. Moreover, if a 
liberal constitutional democracy is, in fact, superior to other forms of 
society, as I believe it to be, a liberal people should have confidence in their 
convictions and suppose that a decent society, when offered due respect by 
liberal peoples, may be more likely, over time, to recognize the advantages 
of liberal institutions and take steps toward becoming more liberal on its 
own. (151) 
 
Kuper does take into account these pragmatic considerations. He admits, in 
fact, that for Rawls «liberals are still able to criticise non-liberal regimes, since 
acceptance of decent peoples in international law by no means implies 
endorsement of their principles by liberals more generally nor does it require 
that non-liberal regimes are viewed as beyond reproach».(152) Yet, on the one 
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hand, he believes that Rawls practical recommendations on how to deal with 
decent people are too weak. Liberals should not only engage in critical 
confrontation with non-liberal peoples, they should also limit decent peoples’ 
engagement in a common global legal structure by requiring reforms in the 
liberal direction, as it is increasingly being invoked by the theory and practice 
of international law. This global legal structure inspired by cosmopolitan values 
would in its turn increase the efficacy of the soft efforts of reforming, from 
outside and within, decent people towards a fully liberal democratic 
organisation of society. (153) On the other hand, Kuper believes that giving 
priority to pragmatic considerations in international relations over above 
normative co-coherence with the dictates of liberalism ends up watering down 
the ‘realistic utopian’ aspiration of a liberal conception of international justice, 
in this way – reminding us of Kant’s observation – risking to «eternalise the 
violation of right». (154) 
Here, the issue thus shifts again to that of the normative appraisal of the 
political moral decency of Rawlsian decent peoples, and to what extent we are 
giving up individual liberties by extending respect to them in the way 
advocated by Rawls. Kuper remains of the same conviction that, as Bruce 
Ackerman puts is, «Rawls proposes a dangerous political compromise» in 
choosing peoples rather than individual as the relevant moral subjects to place 
in the global original position, because, «none of Rawls’ ‘well ordered’ 
hierarchies will be free of natives who are themselves inspired by liberal ideas of 
liberty and equality». (155) His concern is further compounded by Amartya 
Sen’s research on the relationships between democracy and development 
showing that communities that do not guarantee full democratic rights risk 
ending up infringing also the fundamental human rights to life and well-being 
of their members. (156) 
So, in conclusion, is Rawls’s choice of peoples as the moral and political subjects 
of an international conception of justice legitimate from a genuine liberal 
standpoint? I tend to share Kuper’s worries, while understanding and 
appreciating both Rawls’s main normative intent behind his Law of Peoples 
and the epistemological approach that accompanies it. I believe that, given the 
fact of pluralism and the impossibility of deducing liberal principles and 
practices from a priori considerations of rationality, and thus the impossibility 
of drawing a clear-cut line between liberal and decent non-liberal people, it is 
both a wise pragmatic principle and part of the liberal commitment to freedom 
and equality to maintain a relaxed – we could even say anti-foundationalist – 
approach to toleration; reminding ourselves at the same time that relaxed 
toleration does not in the slightest entail withdrawal from rational criticism. At 
this point there is space for disagreement about the correct non-intrusive ways 
to interact with decent peoples with a view to encouraging them to move 
towards liberal democratic principles. Kuper believes there is more room for 
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manoeuvre than Rawls seem to believe, and he may be correct. However, the 
disagreement on the normative ethos of liberalism here intertwines with that 
over concrete policy recommendations of action, which is a terrain on which 
Rawls is not walking, and we do not want to walk either here. The point 
remains, though, that the relaxed attitude towards toleration recommended by 
Rawls is crucial in order to release the tensions between the universalistic 
aspirations of human rights and democratic principles and cultural 
particularism, and thus for accommodating cosmopolitanism with 
multiculturalism.  
Yet Kuper’s worries, which are also reflected in his more substantive and pro-
active policy recommendations, are legitimate, because, as he rightly reminds 
us, history has shown us that when priority is given to communities vis-à-vis 
individuals, and when our normative aspirations give too much way to 
pragmatic considerations, serious violations of human rights take place, and our 
driving ideals, losing their utopian element, lose their capacity to drive us 
towards concrete reforms of our present predicament. Rawls, I believe, would 
agree with these concerns of Kuper. None the less it is never too much to 
remind us, as Kuper does, that our appreciation of, and our respect for, the 
valuable and significant role that cultures, traditions and shared histories play 
in individuals’ life-projects and self-realisation, should not blind us to the fact 
that the shared institutions, culture and conceptions of good of a people are not 
undisputed and undisputable facts of nature, but can and should be criticized 
when they are felt and judged to be violating individuals’ autonomy. I have no 
doubt that Rawls would agree with this cautionary remark, given both his 
unshakable commitment to the priority of the right over the good, and his anti-
foundationalist awareness. For this same reason I agree with Kuper that it 
would be better to take individuals as the primary moral and political subjects 
of global justice, and let the role of culture in the realization of their life project 




In this paper I have argued that Rawls’s reflections on justice, from his A 
Theory of Justice to The Law of Peoples, passing through Political Liberalism, 
elaborate what I call an anti-foundationalist deliberative democratic conception 
of liberal justice concerned to accommodate its universalistic aspirations with 
multiculturalism.  
I have argued in particular that ‘justice as fairness’ cannot be considered the 
expression of a deontological theory attempting to ground the principles of 
liberal justice on absolute grounds, trying to deduce them from an a priori 
conception of rationality. Justice as fairness stands, in fact, on a firm 
ethnocentric epistemological awareness, as it is exemplified by his ‘reflective 
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equilibrium’ conception of justification. Indeed, justice as fairness expresses a 
particular conception of the good among many others, only a more liberal one 
that aims at enabling different comprehensive view of the world to live together 
on terms of reciprocal respect. This moral point of view is conveyed by the 
normative device of representation that Rawls calls ‘the original position’. Its 
epistemological significance is not a foundational one, as it represents only an 
attempt to formulate in a clear and coherent way the moral intuitions that 
Rawls regards as contained in the moral and political tradition to which he 
belongs.  
I have argued that this ethnocentric normative awareness has been further 
stressed by his later conception of public reason, which he introduces to replace 
the construction of the original position as the driving normative core of his 
conception of liberal justice. The notion of public reason, I also argued, allows 
Rawls to meet the objections of those theorists of democracy who failed to 
appreciate the discursive dimension of his conception of political legitimacy in 
A Theory of Justice. The notion of public reason enables him to depart from the 
abstraction of the original position and come down to the worldly, deliberative, 
reality of the principle of reciprocity that has always been at the centre of 
justice as fairness. I have further argued that the combination of Rawls’s 
commitment to public deliberation and his anti-foundationalist awareness leads 
him to appreciate how the liberal project should be centred on a commitment to 
self-reflexively keep open to debate and revision the outcomes of its 
deliberations as well as its fundamental assumptions.   
Finally I have illustrated how Rawls’s contribution to the theory of 
international relations and global justice should be considered an attempt to 
draw a difficult and risky path through the muddy and contested ‘no man’s 
land’ running between individual and collective rights, cosmopolitanism and 
multiculturalism, without falling into the opposed but similar traps of blind and 
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